Gideon Yaffe presents a ground-breaking work which demonstrates the importance of philosophy of action for the law. Many people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. Yaffe's clear account of what it is to try to do something promises to resolve the difficulties courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes.
Gideon Yaffe presents a ground-breaking work which demonstrates the importance of philosophy of action for the law. Many people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. So the law governing attempted crimes is of practical as well as theoretical importance. Questions arising in the adjudication of attempts intersect with questions in the philosophy of action, such as what intention a person must have, if any, and what a person must do, ifanything, to be trying to act. Yaffe offers solutions to the difficult problems courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes. He argues that the problems courts face admit of principled solutionthrough reflection either on what it is to try to do something; or on what evidence is required for someone to be shown to have tried to do something; or on what sentence for an attempt is fair given the close relation between attempts and completions. The book argues that to try to do something is to be committed by one's intention to each of the components of success and to be guided by those commitments. Recognizing the implications of this simple and plausible position helps us to identifyprincipled grounds on which the courts ought to distinguish between defendants charged with attempted crimes.
Gideon Yaffe is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Law at the University of Southern California. He is also a member of the network on criminal responsibility and prediction of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's Law and Neuroscience Project. He is the author of books and articles concerned with moral and criminal responsibility and the history of thought about those topics.
IntroductionPart 1: What are Attempts and Why Do We Criminalize Them?1: Rationalizing the Criminalization of Attempt2: The Need for an Intention3: The Nature of TryingAppendix: A Competing Conception of TryingPart 2: The Elemental Conception of the Intention in Attempt and Its Implications4: The Intention in Attempt5: Circumstances and "Impossibility"Appendix: Lady Eldon and Her Children, Mr. Fact and Mr. Law6: If it Can't be Done Intentionally Can it be Tried?7: Trying by Asking: Solicitation as AttemptPart 3: The Evidential Conception of the Act Element and Its Implications8: The Need for an Act9: Stupid Plans and Inherent Impossibility10: The Act in AttemptPart 4: Sentencing Attempts11: Abandonment and Change of Mind12: Is it Unfair to Punish Completed Crimes More than Attempts?Bibliography
`Review from previous edition a resounding success ... will help to shape the agenda for the philosophical treatment of the problem of attempted crimes for some years to come'Journal of Applied Philosophy
A major work at the intersection of philosophy and law
Gideon Yaffe presents a ground-breaking work which demonstrates the importance of philosophy of action for the law. Many people are serving sentences not for completing crimes, but for trying to. So the law governing attempted crimes is of practical as well as theoretical importance. Questions arising in the adjudication of attempts intersect with questions in the philosophy of action, such as what intention a person must have, if any, and what a person must do, if
anything, to be trying to act. Yaffe offers solutions to the difficult problems courts face in the adjudication of attempted crimes. He argues that the problems courts face admit of principled solution
through reflection either on what it is to try to do something; or on what evidence is required for someone to be shown to have tried to do something; or on what sentence for an attempt is fair given the close relation between attempts and completions. The book argues that to try to do something is to be committed by one's intention to each of the components of success and to be guided by those commitments. Recognizing the implications of this simple and plausible position helps us to identify
principled grounds on which the courts ought to distinguish between defendants charged with attempted crimes.
`Review from previous edition a resounding success ... will help to shape the agenda for the philosophical treatment of the problem of attempted crimes for some years to come'
Journal of Applied Philosophy
"There is much fine-grained work to admire in this book." -- Mind
A major work at the intersection of philosophy and law
Will appeal to both philosophers and legal theorists
Significant practical implications for cases of attempted crime